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No Free Parking: Obtaining Relief from 
Trademark-Infringing Domain Name Parking 
Elizabeth M. Flanagan∗ 
Over 128 million domain names—the worldwide web ad-
dresses most familiar to Internet users—are currently regis-
tered across the globe.1 Instead of adding value and diversity to 
the Internet, however, many of these registered domain names 
amount to nothing more than nuisance sites that annoy and 
discourage Internet users and frustrate trademark owners. A 
significant number of registered domain names link to websites 
brimming with advertisements or pay-per-click links.2 It should 
be no surprise that money fuels the domain name registration 
movement.3 
Recently, commercial domain name parking, a means for 
Internet advertising that exploits trademarks without the 
mark owner’s consent,4 has emerged as a relatively easy way to 
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 1. The VeriSign Domain Report, DOMAIN NAME BRIEF (VeriSign, Inc., 
Mountainview, Cal.), at 2, http://www.verisign.com/static/042161.pdf. 
 2. See Brian Quinton, Google’s Parking Problem, DIRECT, Mar. 1, 2007, 
at 50, available at http://www.directmag.com/opinions-columnists/websight/ 
marketing_googles_parking_problems (“[Domain name speculators] buy a do-
main name—some popular word or phrase ending in ‘.com’ that some portion 
of the public may type into a browser navigation bar thinking they’ll find an 
authoritative site . . . [but w]hat they get is a site full of pay-per-click ads, 
sometimes with a little content but often not.”). 
 3. See Patrick Thobideau, Cybersquatting Can Yield Pay-Per-Click Boun-
ties, COMPUTER WORLD, Apr. 16, 2007, at 1, available at http://www 
.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId= 
289576. 
 4. Leslie Walker & Brian Krebs, The Web’s Million-Dollar Typos, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 30, 2006, at F01 (relaying a law professor’s assertion that “the 
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generate income.5 Domain name parking occurs when a domain 
name registrant deposits its domain names with a registrar or 
parking service provider who “creates placeholder pages and 
then invites . . . Internet ad networks to fill them with ads” as 
opposed to constructing a functional website.6 This scheme gen-
erates money when Internet surfers click on links to other web-
sites advertised on the parked page.7 For every user’s click, the 
advertiser indirectly pays the domain name registrant, an ac-
tivity referred to as pay-per-click advertising.8 
Imagine a consumer considering the purchase of a Can-
nondale® bicycle who may wish to research various Cannon-
dale bicycle models. The consumer may directly visit 
www.cannondalebikes.com,9 believing it to be a legitimate site 
operated by Cannondale, the bicycle manufacturer. When the 
web page loads, however, the consumer does not see the subs-
tantive website of the company that makes Cannondale bikes. 
Instead, the consumer is confronted with a list of hyperlinks to 
other websites unaffiliated with Cannondale, including links to 
competitors’ websites, websites selling competitors’ products, or 
shopping websites like ebay.com and shopzilla.com.10 The 
 
practice amounts to someone making money off someone else’s trademark 
without permission”). 
 5. Id. (revealing that Wall Street analysts estimate that close to half of 
Google’s $6 billion 2005 revenue originated from ads on partner sites). 
 6. Id. Additionally, when Internet users arrive at the parked sites and 
click on the advertisements, the Internet ad networks receive payment from 
the advertisers and pass on a portion of the revenue to the domain name regi-
strant. Id. 
 7. See, e.g., Bruce A. McDonald, Sites in Shadow: Typosquatters on the 
Web Don’t Deserve the Mask of Anonymity, LEGAL TIMES, June 26, 2006, at 
66–67, available at http://www.schnader.com/Newest_4_02/site%20Files/ 
nletters/pdf/McDonaldSitesShadow6-06.pdf (noting that third-party Website 
owners pay online search engines like Google and Yahoo! to direct traffic to 
their sites, and in turn pay the registrants of the parked pages); Go Daddy 
Inc., Cashparking Service Agreement, https://www.godaddy.com/gdshop/legal_ 
agreements/show_doc.asp?se=%2B&pageid=Cash%5FPark%5FSA (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2007) (establishing GoDaddy’s parking payment policy). 
 8. Press Release, Microsoft, Microsoft Launches Enforcement Campaign 
Targeting Web Site “Cybersquatters” Who Use Online Ads (Aug. 22, 2006), 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2006/aug06/08-22domaindefense 
.mspx. 
 9. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 
949, 952 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999) (“If a user knows 
or can deduce the domain name associated with a Web Site, the user can di-
rectly access the Web Site by typing the domain name into a Web browser, 
without having to conduct a time consuming search.”). 
 10. For another example of a domain name parking scheme, this time in-
volving 1800Contacts.com, see Contracting the Internet: Does ICANN Create a 
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parked domain, cannondalebikes.com, presents the consumer 
with navigation options but fails to identify the intended target 
of the consumer’s direct navigation attempt—Cannondale’s 
bike-specific webpage: cannondale.com/bikes. This scenario is 
just an example of the millions of parked domain names that 
frustrate trademark owners and are encountered by consumers 
on a daily basis.11 
Domain name parking harms and annoys trademark own-
ers and consumers. Mark owners are injured because unaffi-
liated domain name registrants can incorporate the owners’ 
marks into parked domain names, reducing the trademark 
owner’s ability to control the use of their mark in cyberspace 
and diverting consumers to competitors’ websites.12 Some 
trademark owners have taken legal action to resolve these 
problems and enforce their trademark rights. For example, Mi-
crosoft has filed suit against registrants of domain names it 
claims are confusingly similar to Microsoft’s trademark.13  
Moreover, advertisers who pay domain name parking service 
providers to place their advertisements on websites do not like 
being connected to potentially infringing parked domain 
 
Barrier to Small Businesses: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Business, 
109th Cong. 63–76 (2006) (statement of Steven Delbianco, Exec. Director, 
NetChoice) [hereinafter Delbianco Testimony]. 
 11. See Frances Williams, Cybersquat Threat to Trademarks, FIN. TIMES, 
Mar. 13, 2007, at 11 (“According to [the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion], companies that make a business of buying, selling and parking domain 
names account for a significant share of the 120 [million] website addresses 
registered worldwide. In addition, tens of millions of domain names are tem-
porarily registered every month for ‘tasting,’ with only those names that gen-
erate significant traffic retained.”). 
 12. See Walker & Krebs, supra note 4 (quoting Verizon Wireless’s 
spokesman as condemning parking because those “sites are siphoning off traf-
fic by tricking people who have tried to obtain information about Verizon 
Wireless”); see also McDonald, supra note 7, at 67 (“Trademark counterfeiters 
often set up ‘parked’ Web Sites, which exist for no purpose other than to at-
tract and redirect Internet traffic to other sites.”). 
 13. Complaint at 28, Microsoft Corp. v. Brown, No. CV06-5247 (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. 21, 2006) (“When a person looking for a Microsoft website lands on one of 
Defendant’s Websites, that person may click on one of the advertisements or 
hyperlinks on the site either because the person finds it easier to click on the 
advertisement or hyperlink than to continue searching for the Microsoft site, 
or because the person mistakenly believes Microsoft has authorized or en-
dorsed the advertisements or hyperlinks. In either case, the person has been 
diverted from the Microsoft website he or she was seeking to visit, and Micro-
soft has lost that opportunity to interact with that person.”); see also Gregg 
Keizer, YOURKOMPANYNAME.COM—Typo-Squatter Landgrab, INFO. 
WEEK, Aug. 28, 2006, at 15 (noting that Microsoft has filed two federal law-
suits regarding typosquatting). 
 2007] DOMAIN NAME PARKING 501 
 
names.14 Internet consumers may also be misled or frustrated 
by domain name parking activities when they seek out a 
brand’s website but instead encounter a detour. Although an 
infringing parked domain name may not appear individually 
problematic, a broader view of the implications of domain name 
parking reveals that trademark owners can neither single-
handedly stop this activity nor protect consumers from being 
misled. 
This Note discusses how commercial domain name parking 
affects both trademark owners and consumers and suggests po-
tential solutions regarding how those two groups may obtain 
relief from this abusive practice. Part I explains the concept of 
domain name parking and discusses the function of trademarks 
in cyberspace. Part II discusses the tools trademark owners can 
use to take legal action against domain name parking, includ-
ing the Lanham Act, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protec-
tion Act (ACPA), and indirect trademark infringement liability. 
Part III suggests that the ACPA and the Lanham Act may pro-
vide an avenue of redress for trademark owners against domain 
name registrants and parking service providers who, without 
consent, profit from their mark. In practice, however, these sta-
tutes cannot rectify the effects of domain name parking on a 
large scale because each trademark owner must individually 
pursue the perpetrators of this infringing activity, and there 
are significant practical obstacles and expenses in doing so. 
Part III concludes by urging that, outside the general statutory 
framework, the Federal Trade Commission should initiate law-
suits against registrants of parked domain names and domain 
name parking service providers. Together, current trademark 
law and FTC enforcement would allow trademarks to function 
properly in cyberspace by permitting trademark owners to re-
gain control over their marks and by protecting consumers 
from unexpected and confusing detours. 
 
 14. Such advertisers are likely to contest concepts of unjust enrichment in 
relation to commercial domain name parking. See Complaint at 34, Crafts by 
Veronica v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-01985-JCL-MF (D.N.J. May 1, 2006), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/technology/documents/ 
yahoo_may2006.pdf (alleging harm because defendants placed ads “within 
‘parking’ and other bulk registration sites” even though “Defendants 
represented that Class Members’ ads would be shown in ‘popular, high-quality 
sites’ . . . not second-rate content-less sites users only reach because they 
guessed or misspelled a domain name”); see also McDonald, supra note 7, at 2 
(describing litigation initiated by advertisers claiming that Google and Yahoo! 
“collude with typosquatters to use infringing parked Web Sites as a means of 
illicitly redirecting Internet traffic to the advertisers’ Web Sites”). 
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I.  AN OVERVIEW OF TRADEMARK FUNCTION IN 
CYBERSPACE   
Trademarks have been a hot commodity on the Internet 
since its inception. Businesses and forward-looking individuals 
sought to stake a claim on the web by registering valuable 
trademarks as domain names.15 Part I first introduces the pur-
poses underlying trademark law and sets forth the basic con-
cept of commercial domain name parking. Part I then describes 
the problems domain name parking presents for trademark 
owners and Internet consumers. 
A. PURPOSES UNDERLYING TRADEMARKS AND TRADEMARK LAW 
In their most basic form, trademarks are valuable source 
identifiers that help consumers quickly identify products and 
differentiate between competing goods and services.16 Trade-
mark law serves to maintain the function of trademarks in two 
ways. Since “trademarks create an incentive to keep up a good 
reputation for a predictable quality of goods,”17 trademark law 
correspondingly protects a mark owner’s investment in the 
quality of its mark and the corresponding goods and services.18 
Second, trademark law aids consumers by ensuring the quality 
of the brand information they receive and by preventing them 
from being confused.19 When trademark owners bring suit 
against alleged infringers, seeking the protections of trademark 
law, trademark owners act not only in their own interest, but 
also in the interest of consumers.20 The policies of protecting 
the goodwill that trademark owners have developed through 
the investment of time, effort, and money, and of preventing 
 
 15. H. Brian Holland, Tempest in a Teapot or Tidal Wave? Cybersquatting 
Rights and Remedies Run Amok, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 301, 302–03 (2005) 
(portraying the registration of domain names corresponding to valuable 
trademarks as a “land rush”). 
 16. John Dwight Ingram, The Genericide of Trademarks, 2 BUFF. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 154, 154 (2004) (listing the functions of trademarks). 
 17. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 2:4 (4th ed. 2007); see also ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 20 (4th ed. 2006). 
 18. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 2:4; see also Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar 
Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 213 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Congress 
enacted the Lanham Act ‘to secure trade-mark owners in the goodwill which 
they have built up.’”). 
 19. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 20–21. 
 20. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 2:33; MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, 
at 29–30. 
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consumers from being confused, underscore the main premises 
of trademark law.21 
B. THE ESCALATING PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL DOMAIN NAME 
PARKING 
A domain name consists of a top-level extension like .com, 
.org, and .net, preceded by a second-level extension, often a 
trademark or a company name, which distinguishes one web-
site from another.22 The benefit of the domain name system is 
that each domain name is unique; the problem with the system 
is that each domain name is registered on a first-come, first-
served basis.23 This arrangement may be a recipe for success 
for some, but it can be disastrous for trademark owners.24 
For trademark owners, the Internet provides a profitable, 
but problematic, platform for business growth.25 Mark owners 
often deal with numerous headaches inflicted by third parties, 
often referred to as cybersquatters.26 Cybersquatting initially 
embodied the practice of registering domain names consisting 
of valuable trademarks and subsequently approaching the 
trademark owners with demands for large payments to transfer 
control of the domain name to the mark’s owner.27 For example, 
notorious cybersquatter Dennis Toeppen made a business of re-
gistering “well known marks” and demanding payment from 
the owners of the marks.28 Routine cybersquatting practices 
quickly expanded to typosquatting, where a third party regis-
ters domain names similar to valuable trademarks but differ by 
 
 21. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trade-
mark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844–46 & n.13 (2007). 
 22. Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 783 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 23. Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 
(2d Cir. 2000). 
 24. See Jonathan H. Gatsik, Note, Cybersquatting: Identity Theft in Dis-
guise, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 277, 278 (2001) (“Cybersquatters typically vic-
timize business entities . . . because the domain name has monetary value, re-
gardless of whether the cybersquatter attempts to sell the domain name to the 
business or entity or traffics in consumers on the Internet.”). 
 25. See Holland, supra note 15, at 308–09 (showing the exponential 
growth rate of e-commerce transactions from 1999 to 2003). 
 26. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1300 
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (outlining defendant’s registration of panavision.com and de-
mands for money to “discontinue his ‘use’ of the domain name”), aff’d, 141 F.3d 
1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 27. See MICHAEL J. REMINGTON ET AL., CYBERSQUATTERS BEWARE: 
TRADEMARK OWNERS ARE FIGHTING BACK 2 (2004). 
 28. Panavision Int’l, 945 F. Supp. at 1300. 
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reflecting common typographic errors Internet users make 
when attempting to reach a website via direct navigation.29 Ty-
posquatting exemplifies a misuse of trademarks in cyberspace 
that injures trademark owners with similar underlying profit 
motives as traditional cybersquatting.30 
Domain name parking incorporates the basic concepts of 
cybersquatting and typosquatting: it exploits another’s trade-
mark for commercial gain.31 Domain name parking can occur 
when domain names are registered, but before a corresponding 
website is constructed or operable.32 Rather than allowing the 
domain name to lay idle, registrants may park domain names 
pending site development in the short term. Alternatively, do-
main name parking can occur when domain names are regis-
tered for the express purpose of parking it to generate profits in 
the long run.33 Internet users often reach parked web pages 
when their direct navigation attempts fail due to an incorrect 
guess at a domain name or because they commit typographical 
errors. In those cases, domain name speculators position the 
domain name at webpages filled with advertisements that dis-
tract Internets users from the websites they originally intended 
to visit.34 In effect, “[s]urfing to these Web pages leads site visi-
tors to a screen chock full of pay-per-click advertisements and 
 
 29. See Christopher G. Clark, The Truth in Domain Names Act of 2003 
and a Preventative Measure to Combat Typosquatting, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
1476, 1480 (2004) (describing typosquatting as the practice of “identifying legi-
timate popular web sites and purposefully registering deceptively similar or 
deliberately misspelled domain names”). 
 30. See id. at 1481 (“[T]yposquatters also profit if owners of the legitimate 
domain name are willing to purchase the deceptive domain name to prevent 
further confusion.”). 
 31. See Delbianco Testimony, supra note 10, at 72 (“A ‘parked’ website is 
one that closely resembles a popular domain name . . . . Based solely on traffic 
generated by user errors, parking sites earn easy money when users click on 
ads displayed on the page.”). 
 32. AllBusiness.com, Inc., Domain Name Parking Primer, http://www 
.allbusiness.com/technology/internet-domain-names/3922-1.html (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2007) (“‘Parking’ means your registrar puts up a placeholder page at 
your new Web address until you are ready to launch your new site.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Jon Swartz, Domain Names Become Premium Web Real Es-
tate, USA TODAY, May 10, 2006, at 3B (explaining the long-term investment 
aspects of domain name parking). 
 34. Walker & Krebs, supra note 4 (quoting an intellectual property attor-
ney and professor who stated that “[i]f everyone has to spend a whole bunch of 
time wading through all this look-alike crap online, then the value [of trade-
marks serving as source identifiers] for Internet consumers is going to be se-
riously reduced”). 
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little meaningful content.”35 Thus, domain name parking ob-
structs key trademark law objectives by hindering a mark own-
er’s ability to indicate the single source of the goods or services 
of the mark and impedes customers’ attempts to locate a de-
sired website. 
C. THE HARMS OF DOMAIN NAME PARKING 
Trademark law protects mark owners’ intellectual property 
rights and aids consumers in the marketplace.36 This Section 
discusses mark owners’ motivations to contest domain name 
parking that amounts to trademark infringement and explains 
why consumers benefit from such enforcement activities. 
1. Domain Name Parking Hinders the Ability of Trademark 
Owners to Control Their Marks 
Domain name parking creates both business and legal 
problems for trademark owners.37 Because trademarks function 
as source identifiers,38 often becoming part of consumers’ ver-
nacular, domain names that include famous or well-known 
trademarks are highly valued.39 Many Internet users who di-
rectly navigate the Internet reach websites by enclosing a well-
known trademark between “www.” and “.com.”40 Prudent busi-
nesses obtain domain names that conform to this formula in 
 
 35. Press Release, Microsoft, supra note 8. 
 36. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 3:1(B). 
 37. Ryan Kaatz & Julie Erin Land, Microsoft Files Federal Complaints to 
Combat Extensive Trademark Infringement and Cybersquatting, MONDAQ 
(Oct. 3, 2006), http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?article_id=42844 (noting 
that domain name parkers “allegedly profit from these domain names by di-
verting Internet traffic to websites containing advertisements and hyperlinks, 
from which [they] receive advertising revenue and click-through payments 
each time a misdirected Internet user clicks on one of the links”). 
 38. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 
761 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
 39. Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (C.D. Cal. 
1996) (“[H]aving a known or deducible domain name is important to compa-
nies seeking to do business on the Internet, as well as important to consumers 
who want to locate those business’ web sites.”), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
 40. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 
949, 952 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“Because most businesses with a presence on the 
Internet use the ‘.com’ top-level domain, Internet users intuitively try to find 
businesses by typing in the corporate or trade name as the second-level do-
main . . . .”), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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order to protect their trademark and its goodwill and to assist 
their customers in finding their website quickly and easily.41 
Domain name registrants target and incorporate trade-
marks into their parked domain names because the earning po-
tential of parked domains increases when the domains exploit a 
brand’s value.42 Contrary to and perhaps more troubling than 
traditional cybersquatting, a registrant who parks a domain 
name has little incentive to approach the trademark owner to 
demand money in exchange for the transfer of the domain 
name.43 When the registered domain name experiences a high 
volume of traffic, the benefits of retaining the domain name 
grow as the profits from the advertising revenue increase.44 
The result is an enormous stockpile of parked domain names, 
more detours on the information superhighway for Internet us-
ers and an illegitimate means of generating revenue from the 
unauthorized use of another’s trademark.45 
Trademark owners have strong incentives to protect their 
marks and to stop infringing activities. If a trademark owner 
does not vigorously monitor and take action against the unau-
thorized use of its mark, the mark may become legally weak 
and even generic, the ultimate consequence of lax trademark 
 
 41. See id. at 953 (“In short, the exclusive quality of second-level domain 
names has set trademark owners against each other in the struggle to estab-
lish a commercial presence on the Internet, and has set businesses against 
domain name holders who seek to continue the traditional use of the Internet 
as a non-commercial medium of communication.”); S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 5 
(1999) (“The practice of cybersquatting harms consumers, electronic com-
merce, and the goodwill equity of valuable United States brand names, upon 
which consumers increasingly rely to locate the true source of genuine goods 
and services on the Internet.”). 
 42. Cf. Kaatz & Land, supra note 37 (comparing the monthly deletion 
rates of registered domain names in April 2005 and April 2006 and concluding 
that a higher deletion rate corresponds to increased profitability and creates 
incentives to acquire and hold on to high-traffic domain names and to discard 
low-traffic domain names). 
 43. Cf. id. (“The trend of collecting and exploiting high-traffic domain 
names is reflected in a dramatic increase in registrants or registrars tasting 
. . . domain names for web traffic volume rather than registering them for 
long-term web development.”). 
 44. See Clark, supra note 29, at 1489–90. 
 45. See Delbianco Testimony, supra note 10 (“[W]hen typos happen, legi-
timate businesses shouldn’t lose customers who fall into traps designed to 
generate ad revenue. What’s more, the ad revenue generated by parking 
drives up the price if the intended business tries to acquire the domain name 
from the parking operator.”). 
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enforcement.46 When a trademark becomes the common de-
scriptive name of a type of product, rather than the original 
trademark owner’s product, the trademark owner no longer has 
exclusive rights to its use.47 As a result, the mark becomes “ge-
neric” since it no longer serves as a source-identifier.48 There-
fore, many trademark owners find it prudent to police against 
infringing domain name registrations by using third parties to 
monitor and identify potential cybersquatters.49 Additionally, 
because registrars do not scrutinize the domain name for po-
tential trademark infringement before registering them, there 
is a growing need for others to police newly registered domain 
names.50 Aside from presenting concerns of weakening the 
mark or genericide, infringing acts threaten a mark owner’s 
ability to retain its customer base, potentially resulting in lost 
customers and sales. As with all other forms of infringement, 
trademark owners have an incentive to thwart domain name 
parking activities that violate their intellectual property rights 
and threaten their businesses. 
2. Domain Name Parking Impermissibly Compounds 
Consumer Confusion on the Internet 
Domain name parking also presents concerns for Internet 
users. Domain name parking can distract, confuse, and mislead 
Internet users.51 While parked domains may benefit consumers 
by providing options in the form of links to competitive or simi-
lar websites, the negative characteristics of parked domains 
dominate. Just as the tangible effects of too-similar brand 
names confuse consumers, a parked domain name misleads 
 
 46. When a trademark becomes generic, the trademark owner loses both 
the exclusive right to its use and its investment in developing the mark’s 
goodwill. See Ingram, supra note 16, at 154. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. Consider the former registered trademarks cellophane, aspirin, 
and trampoline. Those trademarks once enjoyed legal protection, but after 
rampant misuse by others—such as calling any dose of acetyl salicylic acid by 
the tradename “aspirin”—and failure by the trademark owner to take appro-
priate enforcement measures, the trademark owner lost the federal registra-
tion for the mark, which could then be used industry-wide. See id. at 154–57. 
 49. See REMINGTON ET AL., supra note 27, at 31 (advocating third-party 
monitoring to combat cybersquatting). 
 50. See Holland, supra note 15, at 307 (“[R]egistrars do not consider the 
trademark significance of (or possible infringement resulting from) a particu-
lar registration.”). 
 51. Delbianco Testimony, supra note 10 (“Parking sites confuse and divert 
potential customers.”). 
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consumers into pursuing an undesired end. This is especially 
true when the links offered on the parked page are described by 
the trademark, but the official website of the trademark owner 
does not appear.52 Consumers might follow any link whose de-
scription bears the same trademark they attempted to reach by 
direct navigation.53 Thus, domain name parking can catch In-
ternet consumers in a complex maze rather than aiding con-
sumers, and it disrupts the underlying principles of trade-
marks. 
II.  PROTECTING TRADEMARKS IN CYBERSPACE   
Part I discussed the concept of domain name parking with-
in the context of trademark infringement and explained the ac-
tivity’s harms. Part II describes the enforcement mechanisms 
available for trademark owners to challenge trademark misuse 
in cyberspace. Those mechanisms include section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, the traditional statute used to combat trademark 
infringement;54 the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection 
Act, a discrete section of the Lanham Act directed towards pre-
venting cybersquatting, a particular type of trademark in-
fringement,55 and theories of contributory trademark infringe-
ment. 
A. SETTING THE STAGE FOR TRADEMARK PROTECTION: THE 
LANHAM ACT 
The Lanham Act56 provides federal protection for trade-
marks.57 The Act seeks “to ensure that ‘where the holder of a 
trademark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to 
the public [his] product, he is protected in his investment from 
its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.’”58 The law prohi-
bits others “from appropriating or copying them and taking ad-
 
 52. See Walker & Krebs, supra note 4, at F01. 
 53. See Quinton, supra note 2, at 50. 
 54. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (West Supp. 2007). 
 55. Id. § 1125(d). 
 56. Id. §§ 1051–1072, 1091–1096, 1111–1127, 1141. 
 57. See Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of 
“Trademark Use,” 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 376–77 (2006) (explaining that 
the “purpose of trademark protection is to foster competition” and that 
“trademark law . . . does not convey monopoly rights . . . [r]ather, businesses 
have ‘property’ rights in their trademarks only to the extent necessary to pre-
vent unauthorized uses that cause a likelihood of consumer confusion”). 
 58. Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 777–78 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting 
S. REP. NO. 1333, at 3 (1946)). 
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vantage of the holder’s good will for their own benefit.”59 The 
overall goal of the Lanham Act is to encourage competition, al-
locate resources, and create an incentive for mark owners to 
improve and maintain product quality.60 
To prevail on an infringement claim under the Lanham 
Act,61 the plaintiff must prove that he has a valid mark,62 that 
the defendant used the mark in commerce “in connection with 
the sale . . . or advertising of goods or services,”63 and that the 
mark was used in a manner that is likely to cause consumer 
confusion.64 Section 1127 defines use in commerce as “the bona 
fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made 
merely to reserve a right in a mark,” and provides examples of 
such use.65 A plaintiff that establishes these core elements may 
be entitled to an injunction, as well as damages.66 
1. It Is Critical to Establish a Likelihood of Consumer 
Confusion in an Infringement Claim 
In order to prevail on a trademark infringement claim, the 
plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s use of the mark is 
likely to confuse an ordinary consumer as to the source or spon-
sorship of the goods.67 Courts generally consider several factors 
in assessing whether the defendant’s use creates confusion, in-
cluding, but not limited to, the strength or distinctiveness of 
the plaintiff ’s mark, the similarity between the plaintiff ’s and 
defendant’s marks, the proximity of the products, the existence 
of actual confusion, the level of sophistication of the consuming 
public, and the defendant’s intent in adopting the same or simi-
lar mark.68 The outcome of the confusion analysis generally 
turns on the specific facts of the case.69 
 
 59. Id. at 777. 
 60. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, §§ 2:1–2:5 (explaining various policy 
rationales underlying trademark law). 
 61. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 406–
07 (2d Cir. 2005) (listing the elements of a trademark infringement claim un-
der various sections of the Lanham Act). 
 62. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000) (establishing liability for the infringe-
ment of registered trademarks); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (establishing liability 
for the infringement of unregistered trademarks). 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). 
 64. Id. 
 65. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West Supp. 2007). 
 66. Id. § 1125(c). 
 67. See, e.g., Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 
2005 WL 1903128, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005). 
 68. See id.; REMINGTON ET AL., supra note 27, at 6–7; John Handy, Why 
 510 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:498 
 
The “initial interest confusion” doctrine allows a mark 
owner to satisfy the likelihood of confusion requirement by de-
monstrating that a certain kind of confusion results from the 
trademark’s use.70 Actionable initial interest confusion has 
been defined as “customer confusion that creates initial interest 
in a competitor’s product” that, “[a]lthough dispelled before an 
actual sale occurs[,] . . . impermissibly capitalizes on the good-
will associated with a mark.”71 While the initial interest confu-
sion doctrine may be characterized as being “particularly appli-
cable to the Internet,”72 not all federal courts of appeals have 
adopted this stance.73 
Even where evidence of confusion exists, courts may ab-
solve a defendant from liability for trademark infringement if 
the defendant shows that its use of the mark does not misap-
propriate the mark’s goodwill.74 A defendant may raise the 
classic fair use defense when using the plaintiff ’s mark in con-
junction with describing the defendant’s own product75 or when 
the defendant uses the mark in its dictionary sense.76 The de-
fendant may raise a nominative fair-use defense if the use of 
the mark describes the plaintiff ’s product but does not attempt 
to exploit consumer confusion or transfer the goodwill asso-
ciated with the mark to the defendant.77 Although fair use may 
 
the Initially Confused Should Get a Clue: The Battle Between Trademark In-
fringement and Consumer Choice Online, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 567, 576 (2006). 
 69. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 2005 WL 1903128, at * 3. 
 70. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 
1024–25 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 71. Id. at 1025. 
 72. Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 764 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003) (quoting Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 55 F. 
Supp. 2d 1070, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 1999), aff’d, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999) (un-
published table decision)). 
 73. See, e.g., id. at 764 (discussing the failure of the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit to acknowledge the initial interest confusion doctrine). 
 74. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 
U.S. 111, 120 (2004) (noting that the defendant need only raise this affirma-
tive defense when the plaintiff has established a likelihood of confusion by a 
preponderance of the evidence); Handy, supra note 68, at 578. 
 75. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 
352 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that a mechanic’s use of Volkswagen’s trademark 
to describe his line of work does not constitute trademark infringement). 
 76. Handy, supra note 68, at 579 (“[A] farmer using the term ‘Apple’ to 
describe his orchard cannot be held to infringe Apple Computer, Inc.’s trade-
mark.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 
2002) (finding the defendant’s use of the Playmate trademark a permissible 
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negate a claim of trademark infringement, establishing a like-
lihood of consumer confusion is necessary to prevail on a 
trademark infringement claim. 
2. The Lanham Act’s Early Utility in Cyberspace 
In early cybersquatting cases, trademark owners sought 
relief from infringing domain name registrants under the Lan-
ham Act.78 For example, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 
1995 (FTDA), an amendment to the Lanham Act,79 was used to 
hold cybersquatter Dennis Toeppen liable for trademark in-
fringement.80 Cybersquatters, however, soon circumvented the 
FTDA by not offering the domain name for sale in connection 
with the sale of goods or services, which is required to implicate 
liability.81 As a result, courts did not thwart the practice of cy-
bersquatting because trademark law did not explicitly provide 
relief from such activity for mark owners in cyberspace.82 As 
the prevalence of cybersquatting increased, Congress further 
amended the law to clarify trademark owners’ rights, to provide 
for adequate remedies, and to deter cyberpiracy and cyber-
squatting.83 
 
nominative fair use because “[t]here is no other way that [defendant] can iden-
tify or describe herself and her services without venturing into absurd descrip-
tive phrases”); Handy, supra note 68, at 579. 
 78. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1306 
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (concluding that the defendant violated federal and state 
trademark dilution statutes by “intentionally registering plaintiff ’s trade-
marks as his Internet domain names”), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 79. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA), Pub. L. No. 104-98, 
109 Stat. 985 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 
2007)). 
 80. Panavision Int’l, 945 F. Supp. at 1304 (“The Court finds that Toep-
pen’s conduct, which prevented Panavision from using its marks in a new and 
important business medium, has diluted Panavision’s marks within the mean-
ing of the statute.”). The FTDA provides remedies when plaintiffs prove their 
mark is famous, the defendant uses the mark commercially, the mark was 
famous before the defendant began using the mark, and the defendant’s use of 
the mark dilutes the mark’s distinctive qualities. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1). 
 81. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a); S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 7 (1999). 
 82. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 7 (“Instances of cybersquatting continue to 
grow each year because there is no clear deterrent and little incentive for cy-
bersquatters to discontinue their abusive practices. While the Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act has been useful in pursuing cybersquatters, cybersquatters 
have become increasingly sophisticated as the case law has developed and now 
take the necessary precautions to insulate themselves from liability.”). 
 83. Id. at 7–8 (listing the findings of Congress in enacting the Anticyber-
squatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)), including the need for legislation banning cybersquat-
ting). 
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B. A RESPONSE TO CYBERSQUATTING: THE ACPA 
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)84 
was Congress’s response to the inadequacies of conventional 
trademark law in addressing cybersquatting. The ACPA pro-
vides a trademark owner with a cause of action against anyone 
who, with a “bad faith intent to profit” from another’s mark, 
“registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name” that is “identical 
or confusingly similar to that mark.”85 The ACPA effectively 
waives the commercial use requirement of a trademark in-
fringement claim, forcing courts to focus on the registrant’s in-
tent.86 The ACPA, however, fails to make mere registration ac-
tionable.87 Therefore, the possible defendants under an ACPA 
claim are limited to the domain name registrant or its autho-
rized licensee.88 Further, the remedies available under the AC-
PA are restricted to the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain 
name or the transfer of the domain name to the mark’s owner.89 
The ACPA lists nine factors that courts may use to eva-
luate the bad faith intent of the domain name registrant.90 
Four factors support the defendant’s good faith registration: the 
registrant’s rights in any marks incorporated into the domain 
name, the extent to which the registrant is known by or asso-
ciated with the marks, any prior bona fide use of the domain 
name in connection with the registrant’s bona fide offering of 
any goods or services, and whether there are any legitimate 
noncommercial or fair uses of the mark on the site accessible 
via the domain name.91 The remaining five enumerated factors 
 
 84. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d). 
 85. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A). 
 86. Adam Silberlight, Domain Name Disputes Under the ACPA in the New 
Millennium: When Is Bad Faith Intent to Profit Really Bad Faith and Has An-
ything Changed with the ACPA’s Inception?, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. ME-
DIA & ENT. L.J. 269, 277 (2002) (“One major difference between traditional 
trademark law and the ACPA . . . is that the ACPA does not require that the 
domain name at issue be used in commerce.”). 
 87. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 
949, 957, 959 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that under pre-ACPA law a registrar’s 
“acceptance of domain name registrations is not a ‘commercial use’”); see also 
Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
 88. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(D). Even before the enactment of the ACPA, 
courts absolved registrars from liability. See Lockheed Martin Corp., 985 F. 
Supp. at 959 (explaining that the registrar’s “acceptance of domain name reg-
istrations is not a ‘commercial use’ within the meaning of the Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act”). 
 89. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(C). 
 90. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(IX). 
 91. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 785 (8th Cir. 2004). 
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weigh against the defendant’s good faith intentions: the regi-
strant’s intent to divert consumers from the true mark owner’s 
online location, the registrant’s willingness to profit from the 
sale, transfer, or assignment of the domain name, whether the 
registrant provided false contact information during the regis-
tration process, the bulk registration of domain names incorpo-
rating others’ marks, and the similarity between the domain 
name and a distinctive or famous mark.92 These bad faith fac-
tors are not exhaustive and allow courts to exercise discretion 
on a case-by-case basis to determine the registrant’s intent.93 
The ACPA proved a successful tool in combating one in-
stance of domain parking in Mattel, Inc. v. Adventure Apparel.94 
In Mattel, the defendant operated a commercial website, adven-
tureapparel.com, at which he parked two domain names that 
incorporated Mattel’s BARBIE® trademark, barbiesbeach-
wear.com and barbiesclothing.com.95 The court found that Mat-
tel was entitled to summary judgment on an ACPA claim be-
cause the BARBIE mark in the defendant’s domain names 
diluted the famous mark and was confusingly similar to the 
distinctive Mattel mark.96 The court also found that the defen-
dant demonstrated a bad faith intent to profit from the use of 
the BARBIE mark.97 The court analyzed the nine ACPA bad 
faith factors, and found that, on balance, the defendant exhi-
bited the requisite bad faith.98 The court further held that 
parking the domain names at the defendant’s commercial site 
did not constitute fair use under the ACPA because the defen-
dant did not show a protected, noncommercial use of the do-
main name.99 
Although the district court quickly disposed of the domain 
name parking at issue in Mattel by applying the ACPA, the de-
fendant’s parking activities there are distinguishable from do-
main names parked solely to generate advertising revenue, the 
 
 92. See id. at 785–86. 
 93. See Clark, supra note 29, at 1498–99. 
 94. Mattel, Inc. v. Adventure Apparel, No. 00 Civ. 4085, 2001 WL 1035140 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2001). 
 95. Id. at *1. 
 96. See id. at *2–3. 
 97. Id. at *5. 
 98. Id. at *3–5 (finding that the defendant did not attempt to transfer, 
sell, or assign the domain name to Mattel or a third party, did not withhold 
false contact information when registering the domain, and did register a 
large portfolio of such domain names). 
 99. Id. at *5. 
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focus of this Note. Rather than redirecting traffic to the regi-
strant’s legitimate commercial website, commercially parked 
domains present the Internet user with an abundance of adver-
tisements and hyperlinks.100 Part III discusses whether the 
ACPA would apply to a claim against a domain name regi-
strant who parks his domain name for commercial profit.101 
C. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT IN 
CYBERSPACE 
Trademark owners may also initiate suit against parties 
that indirectly infringe their trademark rights. In the absence 
of explicit statutory language, courts have developed theories of 
contributory and vicarious trademark infringement, which orig-
inally applied to manufacturers and distributors of trade-
marked products.102 For contributory liability to attach, the de-
fendant must either “intentionally induce[] another to infringe 
a trademark” or “continue[] to supply its product to one whom 
it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark in-
fringement.”103 Although the mere registration of domain 
names including another’s mark does not amount to contributo-
ry infringement by the registrar,104 third parties other than re-
gistrars may be held accountable under theories of contributory 
 
 100. See id. at *1. 
 101. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), 
in partnership with the United States Department of Commerce, is the body 
charged with managing the domain name system. See ICANN, Fact Sheet, 
http://www.icann.org/general/fact-sheet.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). 
ICANN has a dispute resolution policy separate from the United States’ feder-
al statutes, the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), 
pursuant to which trademark owners may file complaints against cybersquat-
ters outside the United States federal court system. See ICANN, Uniform Do-
main Name Dispute Resolution Policy, http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/ 
policy.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). UDRP proceedings have determined that 
domain name parking constitutes bad faith use. See, e.g., Beverages & More, 
Inc. v. Glenn Soble, Case No. AF-0092 (eResolution, Mar. 9, 2000), http:// 
www.disputes.org/decisions/0092.htm (finding the defendant’s parking of a 
confusingly similar domain name a bad faith use). 
 102. See Alicia Gámez, WhenU.com, Inc. & Google, Inc.: Parsing Trade-
mark’s Use Requirement, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 403, 409–12 (2006) (tracing 
the development of the indirect and contributory trademark infringement doc-
trines in case law). 
 103. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
 104. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 
949, 967 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that the defendant domain name registrar 
would only be liable for contributory trademark infringement if it had an “af-
firmative duty to police the Internet for infringing uses” of the plaintiff ’s 
trademark), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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infringement. In those situations, the defendant “must supply a 
product to a third party with which the third party infringes [a 
trademark].”105 When the defendant provides a service rather 
than a product, the court will “consider the extent of control ex-
ercised by the defendant over the third party’s means of in-
fringement.”106 Pursuing a theory of contributory infringement 
against providers of domain name parking services remains a 
possibility for trademark owners, but proving such a claim is 
difficult.107 
III.  THE CURRENT TOOLS OF TRADEMARK 
PROTECTION MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED TO PROVIDE 
RELIEF FROM DOMAIN NAME PARKING   
Against the backdrop of trademark law outlined in Part II, 
Part III discusses the potential applicability of the ACPA and 
Lanham Act to commercial domain name parking. By drawing 
on the current state of trademark law in cyberspace, Part III 
argues that trademark owners will likely find relief in the cour-
troom against domain name parking, but only on a piecemeal 
basis. As such, present trademark law cannot efficiently ad-
dress the domain name parking nuisance. Part III concludes by 
considering an administrative mechanism to deter domain 
name parking and provide consumers with relief. 
A. THE ACPA IS MERELY THE FIRST STEP IN COMBATING 
COMMERCIAL DOMAIN NAME PARKING 
The ACPA provides a starting point for trademark owners 
to combat the commercial domain name parking phenomenon 
because the owner can initiate a suit directly against the do-
main name registrant.108 The ACPA is effective at stopping 
traditional typosquatting because the ACPA protects marks in-
corporated into a domain name in a “confusingly similar” man-
ner.109 It follows that, in cases of parked typo-domain-names 
and domains utilizing a trademark along with other words, the 
ACPA should provide relief. 
 
 105. See Lockheed Martin Corp., 194 F.3d at 984. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 806–07 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (commenting on the difficulty of satisfying the test for secondary 
trademark infringement and explaining the plaintiff ’s deficiency in pleading a 
viable claim for contributory infringement). 
 108. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 2007). 
 109. Clark, supra note 29, at 1499–1500. 
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As discussed in Part II.B, a trademark owner must prove 
the defendant’s “bad faith intent to profit” from the trademark 
to prevail under the ACPA.110 In cases where the registrant 
clearly participates in and receives payments from a commer-
cial domain name parking program, the registrant’s intent to 
profit is obvious.111 In determining whether the requisite bad 
faith accompanies intent, one ACPA bad faith factor applies di-
rectly to commercial domain name parking activities: factor five 
analyzes “the person’s intent to divert consumers from the 
mark owner’s online location to a site accessible under the do-
main name that could harm the goodwill represented by the 
mark . . . for commercial gain.”112 Because Internet users often 
incorrectly guess domain names, setting up a parked page that 
anticipates an incorrect guess may demonstrate an intent to 
divert consumers away from the mark owner’s site. Courts 
should consider how long the registrant utilized the domain 
name as a commercial parking device in the bad faith calculus. 
The longer the parked domain name idles and generates reve-
nues from click-through advertising, the less likely the regi-
strant may credibly assert the fair use defense. To ascertain 
whether the pay-per-click advertisements actually divert con-
sumers and damage the trademark’s goodwill, courts may need 
to look at the actual content of the page at which the domain 
name is parked. If the links on the parked page advertise goods 
related to those of the trademark owner, the court may find 
that the registrant acted in bad faith based on his attempt to 
free-ride off of the goodwill associated with the mark.113 
On the other hand, the successful outcome of an ACPA 
claim for domain name parking remains questionable. First, if 
the advertised links lead to goods or services unrelated to the 
trademark, it is less likely the court will consider the registrant 
a free rider hoping to profit from the use of the trademark and 
its goodwill. Second, domain name registrants generally do not 
determine the contents of the parked page. Rather, the parking 
service provider selects the page’s contents.114 Since the ACPA 
 
 110. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i). 
 111. For example, when a registrant has no plans to construct an operable 
website, and instead receives advertising revenue from click-through traffic, 
the registration of a trademark-infringing domain name appears illegitimate. 
 112. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V). 
 113. See id. 
 114. See, e.g., Google, Inc., Google AdSense for Content, https://www.google 
.com/adsense/static/en_US/AfcOverview.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2007) (de-
scribing how the Google AdSense™ program “automatically deliver[s] text and 
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does not explicitly provide comprehensive relief from entities 
other than the domain name registrant,115 the trademark own-
er may be without recourse if it cannot demonstrate the regi-
strant’s bad faith intent. Third, the ACPA’s safe harbor provi-
sion, which provides a safe harbor for registrants who “believed 
and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the do-
main name was a fair use or otherwise lawful,”116 may also 
leave trademark owners without relief. For example, if cannon-
dalebikes.com functioned as a forum for Cannondale fanatics to 
share their thoughts on Cannondale bikes or if its content 
amounted to a parody, the likelihood of a court imposing liabili-
ty becomes unlikely.117 Likewise, when popular names or 
trademarks are included within the domain name of a website 
that advertises related products, a court may not provide relief 
if it draws on comparative advertising principles.118 
Regardless of whether the ACPA may provide relief to 
trademark owners, the ACPA fails to efficiently remedy trade-
mark owners’ concerns. It is expensive and time consuming for 
 
image ads that are precisely targeted to your site and your site content—ads 
so well-matched, in fact, that your readers will actually find them useful”). 
 115. Recall that the ACPA provides a cause of action against a person who, 
with a bad faith intent to profit from the mark, registers, traffics in or uses a 
domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark. 15 
U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A). In theory, the ACPA may be used directly against a 
domain parking service provider since they are “using” a domain name for 
profit. Yet this interpretation does not comport with congressional intent, 
which was primarily directed towards prohibiting bad faith domain name reg-
istrations. See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 7–8 (1999). 
 116. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
 117. Cf. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 
F.3d 359, 366–67 (4th Cir. 2001) (considering, but denying, the defendant’s 
parody defense to allegations of trademark infringement). But see Planned  
Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 WL 
133313, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997) (holding that the First Amend-
ment does not prevent injunctive relief against trademark misuse when the 
use of that trademark is not part of a communicative message). 
 118. Clark, supra note 29, at 1500. Some courts are unwilling to automati-
cally grant relief to a mark owner where the trademarked term is a “basic 
element of the product.” Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 513–14 (7th Cir. 
2002). One court reasoned, “[w]e do not think that by virtue of trademark law 
producers own their aftermarkets and can impede sellers in the aftermarket 
from marketing the trademarked product.” Id. at 513. Note, however, that 
when a domain name incorporating another’s mark is merely parked for the 
purpose of generating revenue, the mark is not likely being used in a manner 
consistent with a fair-use defense. Cf. Mattel Inc. v. Adventure Apparel, No. 
00 Civ. 4085, 2001 WL 1035140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2001) (“Though the 
[parking of infringing domain names at the defendant’s website] was not egre-
gious, it is clearly not the kind of fair use intended by the ACPA.”). 
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trademark owners to tackle infringing, parked domain names 
on a case-by-case basis.119 Moreover, the piecemeal, individua-
lized approach of the ACPA does not permit a court to deter-
mine whether the broader act of commercial domain name 
parking constitutes trademark infringement. 
B. FILLING GAPS WITH THE LANHAM ACT: TARGETING DIRECT 
INFRINGEMENT 
Because the Lanham Act provides a cause of action against 
anyone who misuses a trademark in commerce,120 its scope ex-
tends further than that of the ACPA. Accordingly, trademark 
owners could seek broader relief against commercial domain 
name parking service providers under the Lanham Act. 
1. Pay-Per-Click Advertisements on Parked Domain Pages 
Fulfill the Use Requirement 
Under the Lanham Act, the trademark owner must prove 
that the defendant uses its trademark in commerce.121 In the 
Internet context, courts broadly interpret the use in commerce 
requirement, lessening the plaintiff ’s burden to explain why 
the use is actionable.122 Under a liberal interpretation of “use,” 
 
 119. The ACPA may be more effective when the defendant is both the regi-
strant and registrar. See McDonald, supra note 7, at 67 (explaining that do-
main name registrars register domain names “en masse” and own large portfo-
lios of offensive domain names because their deep pockets enable them to pay 
for the consequences of infringement, if found). However, the limited remedies 
under the ACPA—forfeiture and cancellation of the domain name—do not con-
stitute effective deterrents because registrants can turn around and continue 
to register problematic domains. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(C). 
 120. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns., Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp. 174 
F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999) (considering the defendant’s use of the plain-
tiff ’s trademark as a metatag actionable “use”); 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. Go-
To.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282–83 (D.N.J. 2006) (concluding that the 
defendant’s acceptance of bids of others’ trademarks as keywords constituted 
“use” under the Lanham Act); Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSOnline.com, No. 
Civ. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 737064, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006) 
(“Based on the plain meaning of the Lanham Act, the purchase of search terms 
is a use in commerce.”); Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 
2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004) (permitting the plaintiffs to pursue a cause of ac-
tion against search engine operators who allegedly “unlawfully used [plain-
tiff ’s] trademarks by allowing advertisers to bid on the trademarks and pay 
defendants to be linked to the trademarks”). But see Rescuecom Corp. v. 
Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 400–01 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (concluding that de-
fendant’s sale of plaintiff ’s mark as a keyword does not constitute “use” under 
the Lanham Act); Merck & Co. Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, 425 F. 
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domain name parking activities appear actionable against the 
registrant and against providers of domain name parking ser-
vices.123 Domain parking service providers offer to fill a web 
page with targeted advertisements that relate to the trade-
mark-incorporating domain name.124 As with the cannondale-
bikes.com example, parking service providers often allow do-
main names incorporating another’s trademark to serve as 
parked pages. Thus, both parking service providers and domain 
name registrants likely use a trademark in connection with a 
commercial service as required to state a cause of action under 
the Lanham Act.125 
2. Satisfying the Confusion Requirement 
Employing the initial interest confusion doctrine, the Lan-
ham Act protects against the diversion of consumers’ initial in-
terest.126 Just as courts applied the initial interest confusion 
doctrine in cases involving the exploitation of trademarks as 
metatags127 and search engines,128 the doctrine can apply to 
trademark infringement that occurs with commercial domain 
name parking.129 Initial interest confusion may occur because 
 
Supp. 2d 402, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (concluding that defendant’s purchase of 
plaintiff ’s mark as a keyword for sponsored links is not “use” under the Lan-
ham Act). 
 123. Cf. Edina Realty, 2006 WL 737064, at *3. 
 124. See, e.g., Google Inc., What Is AdSense for Domains?, http://www 
.google.com/domainpark (last visited Nov. 4, 2007) (“AdSense for domains de-
livers targeted, conceptually related advertisements to parked domain pages 
by using Google’s semantic technology to analyze and understand the meaning 
of the domain names.”). But see Sedo LLC, How Do I Choose Keywords and 
Personalize My Parking Page?, http://www.sedo.com/faq/index.php?action= 
artikel&cat=26&id=319 (last visited Nov. 4, 2007) (giving domain name own-
ers the ability to select advertising keywords to use in generating the links on 
their parked pages). 
 125. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1) (2000). 
 126. Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 F.3d at 1063. 
 127. See id. at 1065 (concluding that the Lanham Act precludes the use of 
terms identical or confusingly similar to trademarks as metatags). 
 128. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 
1022–25 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the defendant’s practice of keying, which 
“allows advertisers to target individuals with certain interests by linking ad-
vertisements to pre-identified terms,” presents a good argument for applying 
the initial interest confusion doctrine). But see id. at 1034–35 (Berzon, J., con-
curring) (“I do not think it is reasonable to find initial interest confusion when 
a consumer is never confused as to source or affiliation, but instead knows, or 
should know . . . that a . . . web link is not related to that of the trademark 
holder because the list produced by the search engine so informs him.”). 
 129. But see Zachary J. Zweihorn, Searching for Confusion: The Initial In-
terest Confusion Doctrine and its Misapplication to Search Engine Sponsored 
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parking service providers fill parked pages with contextually 
relevant advertisements, causing consumers to come across op-
portunities for redirection to unexpected websites. When pre-
sented with these options, consumers may try typing in another 
domain name, or they may click-through to another website, 
abandoning their initial destination.130 When the consumer de-
cides to visit the competitor’s site rather than to continue to 
seek the site originally intended, the mark owner is harmed.131 
Assuming that the contents of the parked page relate to 
the trademark incorporated in the parked domain name, it is 
plausible that courts will find a high likelihood that initial in-
terest confusion exists. It is unclear, however, whether con-
sumers actually experience confusion when they arrive at a 
parked page.132 Consumers may be unable to determine the re-
lationship between the trademark used in the domain name 
and the hyperlinks listed on the parked page.133 Parked pages 
do not resemble the fully operative websites of most trademark 
owners. Instead, they typically resemble search engine results 
pages—a list of links with descriptions.134 Although savvy In-
ternet users might recognize a parked page immediately, some 
“[o]nline consumers have a difficult time distinguishing a ge-
 
Links, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1343 passim (2006) (arguing that the initial inter-
est confusion doctrine no longer need be invoked in cyberspace). 
 130. But cf. Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 
746 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (explaining that Internet users can find relief from un-
desired webpages by returning to the previous webpage by clicking on a 
browser’s “Back” button). 
 131. See id. at 764 (“[E]ven though the user knows she is not in the site in-
itially sought, she may stay. In that way, the competitor has captured the 
trademark holder’s potential visitors or customers.” (citing Playboy Enters., 
Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 1999), 
aff’d, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision))). 
 132. Barrett, supra note 57, at 413 (“Internet users are accustomed to en-
countering multiple links on the websites they visit. There is no general expec-
tation that linked and linking sites are part of a single or affiliated entity. 
Permitting trademark owners to regulate use of their marks in connection 
with links may disrupt the effectiveness of the Internet to provide a wide 
range of information efficiently to users.”). But see Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 
F.3d at 1057 (explaining how consumers who happen upon a competitor’s web-
site in attempt to access the trademark owner’s website may realize they are 
at a different site but may be content to remain there). 
 133. Cf. Playboy Enters., 354 F.3d at 1022–27 (allowing the plaintiff ’s 
theory of initial interest confusion based on the defendant’s use of the plain-
tiff ’s trademark in “keying” practices to go forward); Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 
F.3d at 1056–58 (discussing forms of confusion the Lanham Act protects). 
 134. For a representative sample of parked pages under Sedo’s domain 
name parking program, visit http://www.sedo.com/services/tour_parking.php 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2007). 
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nuine site from a pirate site, given that often the only indica-
tions of source and authenticity of the site . . . are the graphical 
interface on the site itself and the Internet address at which it 
resides.”135 Assuming, arguendo, that the use in commerce and 
confusion elements are satisfied, trademark owners may also 
seek redress against third parties for their role in facilitating 
this infringing activity. 
C. SPREADING THE BLAME: CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT BY 
PARKING SERVICE PROVIDERS 
Pursuing claims against the providers of domain name 
parking services cuts to the heart of acts of trademark in-
fringement facilitated by commercial domain name parking.136 
Although such providers argue that their behavior does not 
amount to trademark infringement because they refuse to ex-
tend parking services to infringing domain name registrants, in 
practice it remains unclear whether those policies are en-
forced.137 Therefore, bringing suit against service providers 
may deter their participation in this activity and encourage 
them to enforce their policies. 
A trademark owner could bring a contributory infringe-
ment claim against domain parking service providers, alleging 
that they induce individuals to register and park domain 
names that infringe well-known marks to generate profits from 
pay-per-click advertising. Arguably, one domain parking ser-
vice provider does just that by seeking out large domain name 
portfolio owners to use its unique advertising program geared 
towards parked domains.138 Parking service providers may use 
technology that deciphers domain names to deliver contextually 
relevant pay-per-click advertisements.139 Such continued deli-
very of targeted links to infringing domain names likely falls 
 
 135. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4–5 (1999). 
 136. In some instances, the domain parking service provider and the do-
main name registrar are the same entity. For example, GoDaddy Software, 
Inc., is a licensed registrar and also offers parking services to registrants. See 
GoDaddy Software, Inc., About GoDaddy.com, https://www.godaddy.com/ 
gdshop/about.asp?se=%2B&ci=3802 (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). 
 137. Walker & Krebs, supra note 4 (noting that even Google’s trademark 
lawyer admits that the software algorithms employed to detect trademark in-
fringements are imperfect). 
 138. Google Inc., Maximize Revenue on Your Parked Pages with Google 
AdSense for Domains, http://www.google.com/domainpark (last visited Nov. 4, 
2007). 
 139. Id. 
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within the purview of contributory infringement because the 
parking service provider continues to supply products to those 
it knows or has reason to know engage in trademark infringe-
ment.140 
Further, some registrars permit domain name registra-
tions to be retracted if within a certain window of time—known 
as the “tasting” period—the domain name fails to generate suf-
ficient traffic to make it a worthwhile investment.141 This 
process allows final registration of “those domain names asso-
ciated with well-known trademarks that receive hits during the 
tasting period” and termination of those domain names that do 
not generate sufficient volumes of traffic.142 The preregistration 
tasting scheme presents a more implicit basis for imposing in-
ducement liability on the registrar, both for domain name park-
ing and traditional cybersquatting. Thus, where domain park-
ing service providers undertake affirmative acts to influence 
others to infringe a trademark, liability for contributory in-
fringement may follow.143 
The domain parking service provider exercises control over 
the content of the web pages presented to consumers,144 which 
implicates liability for contributory infringement.145 The park-
 
 140. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982); cf. 
Heidi S. Padawer, Google This: Search Engine Results Weave a Web for 
Trademark Infringement Actions on the Internet, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099, 
1118–19 (2003) (explaining that search engines that sell trademarks should be 
liable for contributory trademark infringement because the “search engine 
would ‘know or ha[ve] reason to know’ of infringing conduct by those with 
whom it contracts,” and acknowledging that, in this case, “the pay-for-
placement model is the direct instrument that might facilitate a cunning web-
site operator’s deviant attempt to lure consumers away from trademarked 
sites by enabling him to buy those trademarked terms from the search en-
gine”). 
 141. This practice, known as tasting, allows the preregistration of a large 
number of domain names that are either deleted or registered depending on 
the number of hits the domain name receives in a five-day period. McDonald, 
supra note 7, at 67; see also Williams, supra note 11. 
 142. McDonald, supra note 7, at 67; Kaatz & Land, supra note 37. 
 143. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Service Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
 144. This is the basis of Google’s AdSense contextual advertising program. 
To participate, domain name registrants need only copy and paste a block of 
html text on a web page. Google Inc., Google AdSense: Get Started in Minutes, 
http://www.google.com/services/adsense_tour/page3.html (last visited Nov. 4, 
2007). 
 145. Perfect 10, Inc., 494 F.3d at 807 (“For liability to attach, there must be 
[d]irect control and monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to 
infringe the plaintiff ’s mark.”). 
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ing service provider generates advertisements that are dis-
played on the parked site using the trademark contained with-
in the domain name.146 Although no manual involvement may 
be required to generate the parked page’s content, the underly-
ing algorithms used to match the advertisements to the infring-
ing domain name nevertheless contribute to the provider’s lia-
bility.147 Because domain parking service providers incentivize 
individuals to register and park infringing domain names and 
control the content of the parked pages, trademark owners 
should target enforcement activities against domain parking 
service providers under theories of contributory liability.148 
Trademark owners have several tools at their disposal to 
challenge commercial domain name parking, directly and indi-
rectly, in the courtroom. But, even though the self-help reme-
dies trademark owners may invoke under the Lanham Act 
could provide some relief from trademark infringement asso-
ciated with commercial domain name parking, the Lanham Act 
does not reach far enough. The infinite number of new domain 
names available for registration and the deep pockets of many 
infringers render the limited remedies available under the  
ACPA and the broader Lanham Act ineffective deterrents.149 
D. THE FTC SHOULD INITIATE SUITS AGAINST DOMAIN NAME 
PARKING ACTORS TO PROVIDE CONSUMERS WITH RELIEF 
Consumers, like trademark owners, experience the adverse 
effects of domain name parking, including confusion, frustra-
tion, and, in extreme cases, fraud.150 This Section argues that 
 
 146. GoDaddy’s CashParking program uses Google’s AdSense technology to 
generate pay-per-click parked pages. See Posting of Jennifer Slegg to Jen-
Sense: Making Sense of Contextual Advertising, http://www.jensense.com/ 
archives/2006/07/google_adsense_10.html (July 20, 2006, 12:21 EST). 
 147. Google Inc., Maximize Revenue on Your Parked Pages with Google 
AdSense for Domains, http://www.google.com/domainpark (last visited Nov. 4, 
2006); Sedo LLC, What Is Domain Parking? Earn Money While You Sleep!, 
http://www.sedo.com/services/parking.php3?language=us (last visited Nov. 4, 
2007) (describing how Sedo hosts websites and provides targeted ad links). 
 148. Cf. Padawer, supra note 140, at 1122 (“[P]ay-for-placement ushers in 
unlitigated issues in trademark infringement, including probable extension of 
the contributory infringement test.”). 
 149. Cf. Michael L. Rustad, Punitive Damages in Cyberspace: Where in the 
World Is the Consumer?, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 39, 41 (2004) (undertaking an empir-
ical analysis and concluding that “punitive damages play no meaningful role 
in protecting consumers in cyberspace despite the epidemic of wrongdoing that 
goes undetected and unpunished by public authorities”). 
 150. See, e.g., John Iwasaki, Third Deal in Spyware Case Defendant to Pay 
$2,000 But Won’t Admit Guilt, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 7, 2006, 
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administrative intervention is necessary to ensure that the 
consumer protection principles underlying trademark law are 
properly upheld. 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is suited to chal-
lenge the negative consequences domain name parking inflicts 
on consumers.151 The FTC has the power under section 5 of the 
FTC Act to prevent “[u]nfair methods of competition . . . and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce.”152 For a practice to be deceptive, the practice must in-
clude a material representation or omission that is likely to 
mislead a reasonable consumer under the circumstances.153 
The FTC can bring suit in federal district court to enjoin the vi-
olation of any law it enforces.154 More broadly, the FTC’s Bu-
reau of Consumer Protection (BCP) protects consumers against 
unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent practices by conducting investi-
gations, initiating lawsuits, and educating consumers about 
their rights.155 
In the past, the FTC has addressed concerns about practic-
es analogous to domain name parking. The FTC brought suit 
against John Zuccarini, a cybersquatter, for violating section 5 
of the FTC Act because he undertook a “concerted course of ac-
tivity involving the redirecting of consumers from their in-
tended destinations on the World Wide Web to his own Web 
pages” and trapped consumers in a series of Web pages display-
ing advertisements for his own financial gain.156 The district 
 
at B5 (explaining how the defendant deceived consumers by fraudulently affi-
liating his business with Microsoft, leading consumers to click on his hyper-
linked advertising and purchase non-Microsoft products). 
 151. “The FTC focuses on stopping actions that threaten consumers’ oppor-
tunities to exercise informed choice.” Hearing Before the H.R. Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property (2002) (statement of Howard 
Beales, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Fed. Trade Comm’n). But see 
Rustad, supra note 149, at 80 (“The FTC is the most active Internet enforcer, 
but even this pro-active agency lacks the necessary resources to patrol cyber-
space.”). 
 152. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000). The FTC Act was amended in 1938 to dec-
lare “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce” illegal. Act of Mar. 21, 
1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111. 
 153. See In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174–84 (1984) (ap-
pending the FTC Policy Statement on Deception of Oct. 14, 1983 to the majori-
ty decision). 
 154. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A). 
 155. See About the Bureau of Consumer Protection, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/ 
about.shtm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). 
 156. F.T.C. v. Zuccarini, No. CIV.A 01-CV-4854, 2002 WL 1378421, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2002); see also F.T.C. v. Zuccarini, No. 01CV4854, 2001 WL 
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court found that Zuccarini’s practice of redirecting and ob-
structing consumers was “likely to cause substantial injury” 
and was “not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consum-
ers or competition.”157 The district court defined “redirecting” 
as “the practice of diverting consumers to Web sites . . . that 
consumers did not intend to visit or access, using tactics includ-
ing . . . operating, publishing, or disseminating Web sites or 
pages with domain names that are confusingly similar to fam-
ous trademarks, service marks or names.”158 Zuccarini was 
permanently restrained from redirecting consumers on the In-
ternet and “[r]epresenting that . . . domain names . . . are en-
dorsed by, or affiliated or associated with, any third party or 
any entity, including . . . any Web site . . . [or] trademark . . . 
when in fact they are not.”159 
Domain name parking is highly analogous to Zuccarini’s 
practice of “redirecting” Internet users and is the type of activi-
ty the FTC should seek to prevent. Domain name parkers, like 
Zuccarini, use cybersquatting and typosquatting tactics to reg-
ister domain names similar to well-known trademarks. They 
both then prey on Internet consumers who mistakenly enter 
those domain names in their Internet browsers by presenting 
the consumers with websites that were not their intended des-
tination. Finally, whereas Zuccarini trapped Internet consum-
ers in a web of pop-up advertisements, commercial domain 
name parkers trap Internet consumers in a maze of pay-per-
click advertisements. Although Zuccarini’s trapping tactics may 
appear more egregious than listings of pay-per-click advertise-
ments, both schemes are designed to frustrate consumers and 
provide the bad actor with profits. Because the effects of and 
methods of implementing these two schemes markedly parallel 
one another, the FTC should draw upon the Zuccarini case to 
proceed against infringing domain name parkers. 
Analogously, the FTC has also used its enforcement powers 
to address spyware, which is “software that monitors computer 
 
34131411, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2001) (granting a temporary restraining 
order against Zuccarini for “engag[ing] in a concerted course of unlawful activ-
ity involving the redirecting of consumers from their intended destinations on 
the . . . Web to his own Web pages, where he traps consumers in multiple se-
ries of Web pages”). 
 157. Zuccarini, 2002 WL 1378421, at *1. 
 158. Id. at *4. 
 159. Id. at *4–5. Zuccarini was also ordered to pay $1,897,166 in equitable 
relief. Id. at *5. 
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usage without a user’s knowledge or consent.”160 Spyware is 
problematic, in part, because it enables third parties to capture 
sensitive personal information, posing risks to privacy and per-
petrating fraud.161 The FTC has filed suit against purveyors of 
spyware, alleging, for example, that they deprive consumers of 
their right of consent and control in software installation.162 
The FTC also initiated suit against “various segments of the 
spyware industry, including adware developers and distribu-
tors, individual advertising/distribution affiliates and interme-
diate advertising/distribution affiliate networks.”163 Notably, 
the FTC brought suit against advertising affiliates that derived 
revenues for disseminating pop-up advertisements.164 The FTC 
alleged that “providing the means and instrumentalities for the 
commission of deceptive and unfair acts and practices” violated 
section 5 of the FTC Act.165  
Although all of the FTC’s spyware suits settled,166 preclud-
ing a decision on whether spyware constitutes an unfair or de-
ceptive practice in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act, these 
cases shed light on how the FTC may proceed against domain 
name parking activities. First, the FTC’s allegations against 
advertising affiliates largely parallel causes of action for con-
tributory trademark infringement.167 The FTC may therefore 
be willing to proceed against domain name parking service pro-
viders for their role in perpetuating this type of trademark in-
fringement and misleading consumers in cyberspace. Second, 
settlements reached between the spyware defendants and the 
FTC are instructive as to the types of relief consumers and 
trademark owners can anticipate. For example, the FTC set 
 
 160. Liying Sun, Who Can Fix the Spyware Problem?, 22 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 555, 555 (2007). 
 161. Id. at 556–57. 
 162. Id. at 570. 
 163. Id. at 572. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 572–73. 
 166. Id. at 574. 
 167. Id. at 573. “[T]he FTC alleged that [the adware vendor] had violated 
the FTC Act because it . . . knew or should have known that its affiliates had 
retained numerous third-party sub-affiliates to install its adware . . . and . . . 
had committed, through affiliates and sub-affiliates acting on its behalf and 
for its benefit, various deceptive and unfair software installations and opera-
tions.” Id. Contributory trademark infringement requires that the defendant 
“continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is 
engaging in trademark infringement.” Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 
456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
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“strict guidelines” on one spyware defendant’s future practices 
and made clear that the defendant would be responsible for af-
filiates acting on its behalf in the future.”168 Even if domain 
name parking suits result in settlements, such settlements will 
likely carve out relief for consumers and trademark owners, 
and begin to clean up cyberspace. 
Additionally, suits brought by the FTC against domain 
name parkers offer several advantages over suits initiated by 
trademark owners. First, the FTC can, in one action, proceed 
against actors who park portfolios of domain names that in-
fringe several different trademarks. Whereas trademark own-
ers are limited to challenging activities that solely affect their 
trademark rights, the FTC can more broadly challenge infring-
ing activities because they are not limited by intellectual prop-
erty rights. Rather, the FTC can proceed against any actor that 
parks infringing domain names to generate pay-per-click ad-
vertising revenue. Thus, the FTC is especially positioned to 
proceed against en masse domain name registrants, more 
quickly reaching the roots of the domain name parking prob-
lem. Second, the FTC’s section 5 enforcement powers are much 
broader than trademark owners’ counterpart, the Lanham Act. 
Whereas a Lanham Act plaintiff must prove use in commerce 
and a likelihood of confusion, the FTC need only show that do-
main name parking is an unfair or deceptive practice, which 
covers a broad range of activity.169 Third, where the FTC pre-
vails, the monetary relief awarded by the court goes back to 
consumers, whereas suits initiated by trademark owners afford 
relief only into the plaintiff ’s hands.170 For these reasons, the 
FTC is a powerful and appropriate body to investigate the ad-
verse affects of domain name parking on consumers in cyber-
space. 
  CONCLUSION   
Beyond serving as an additional conduit for generating ad-
vertising-related profits in cyberspace, commercial domain 
 
 168. Sun, supra note 160, at 574. 
 169. Deborah Platt Majoras, The Federal Trade Commission: Learning 
from History as We Confront Today’s Consumer Challenges, 75 U. MO. KAN. 
CITY L. REV. 115, 130 (2006). 
 170. Id. at 125–26 (“Almost from its inception, this [consumer protection] 
program has proved an effective tool not only to obtain court orders halting 
fraudulent schemes, but also to obtain consumer redress and other potent 
equitable remedies.”). 
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name parking creates another motivation for the registration of 
domain names identical to or confusingly similar to trade-
marks. The implications of this practice are far-reaching. So 
long as the domain name parking trend continues, the likeli-
hood that consumers stumble upon parked pages and are di-
verted from a trademark owner’s website increases. For trade-
mark owners, commercial domain name parking 
misappropriates a mark’s goodwill, lessens the mark’s source-
identifying capacity and potentially erodes a mark owner’s cus-
tomer base. Current trademark law may provide the flexibility 
to appropriately confront the trademark infringement caused 
by domain name parking.171 But trademark law cannot broadly 
address the harms domain name parking inflicts on consumers. 
Administrative involvement, through the FTC, is needed to 
prevent continued frustration, misunderstanding, and chaos on 
the information superhighway. 
 
 171. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp. 174 F.3d 1036, 
1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We must be acutely aware of excessive rigidity when 
applying the law in the Internet context; emerging technologies require a flex-
ible approach.”). 
